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 INTEREST OF AMICI1 
Amicus Brian Wolfman is Associate Professor of 
Law and Director of the Appellate Courts Immersion 
Clinic at Georgetown University Law Center (GULC). 
For five years, he directed a GULC clinic that 
represented Title VII plaintiffs and litigated the 
question presented here: what types of employer 
conduct and practices are prohibited employment 
discrimination under Title VII. Amicus Aderson B. 
Francois is Professor of Law and Director of GULC’s 
Civil Rights Clinic. He litigates Title VII cases, and he 
has written extensively on topics of racial justice. 
Amicus Eric Schnapper is a Seattle attorney who 
regularly represents plaintiffs in Title VII actions in 
this Court and in the lower courts. He was counsel for 
respondent in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe 
Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). 
Amici have a deep and abiding interest that Title 
VII be interpreted to eliminate employment 
discrimination in all of its forms, as demanded by the 
statute’s text and purposes. Because the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision below—which limits prohibited 
employment discrimination to “ultimate employment 
decisions” alone, Pet. App. 4a, such as those involving 
hiring, firing, and compensation—flouts the text and 
undermines Congress’s purposes, this Court should 
grant review and reverse. 
                                            
1 Counsel of record for all parties received notice at least 
ten days prior to the due date of amici’s intention to file this brief. 
The parties have consented to this filing. No counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person other than 
amici, its members, or its counsel made a monetary contribution 
to the preparation or submission of this brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. In Title VII disparate-treatment, employment-
discrimination cases, the term “adverse employment 
action” developed as judicial shorthand for the 
statute’s text. But what started as shorthand has 
taken on a life of its own and now improperly limits 
the statute’s reach. The Fifth Circuit’s version of the 
adverse-employment-action rule stands out as 
especially improper: Only an “ultimate employment 
decision”—a refusal to hire, a firing, a demotion, or the 
like—constitutes impermissible discrimination. This 
standard is inconsistent with Title VII’s text and this 
Court’s precedent construing the statute. 
II. The Fifth Circuit’s rule excludes many 
discriminatory employment practices that are 
unlawful (and, thus, actionable) in its sister circuits. 
The stories of discrimination victims from these other 
jurisdictions demonstrate that the Fifth Circuit’s 
approach is wrong. These individuals suffered 
discrimination that Title VII prohibits, but the Fifth 
Circuit’s standard would enable their employers to 
discriminate without consequence. 
III. Consistent with Title VII’s text and this 
Court’s precedent, an unlawful employment action is 
any discrimination against the employee that can 
properly be attributed to the employer. As long as the 
employer’s intentional, discriminatory conduct 
imposes meaningful harm on the employee, it is 
prohibited by, and may be remedied under, Title VII.  
ARGUMENT 
Title VII prohibits disparate treatment by 
employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin. As reflected in the decision below, the 
3 
Fifth Circuit’s longstanding view is that Title VII 
disparate-treatment claims are actionable only when 
the employer’s “adverse employment action” is an 
“ultimate employment decision,” such as a refusal to 
hire or a firing. Pet. App. 4a. 
But the statute prohibits a far wider range of 
employer practices affecting terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment. Part I explains why that is 
so, based on the statute’s text and this Court’s Title 
VII precedents. Part II then shows, through a 
discussion of decisions from other jurisdictions, that 
the Fifth Circuit’s rule undermines Title VII’s broad 
anti-discrimination purposes. Part III explains that 
Title VII prohibits any intentional discriminatory 
action taken by an employer that results in 
meaningful harm to the employee. 
I. Title VII prohibits a broad range of 
discriminatory employment practices.  
A. The term “adverse employment action” 
started as useful shorthand for Title VII’s 
text, but courts later gave the term an 
impermissibly restrictive meaning.  
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it 
“an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment” because of that individual’s 
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). This provision describes a broad 
universe of prohibited employer practices commonly 
referred to as “disparate treatment.” 
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Early on, lower courts used the term “adverse 
employment action” simply as shorthand for the wide 
range of employment practices prohibited by the 
statute. See, e.g., Jefferies v. Harris Cty. Cmty. Action 
Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032, 1034 (5th Cir. 1980); 
Womack v. Munson, 619 F.2d 1292, 1296, 1297 n.7 
(8th Cir. 1980). Leftwich v. U.S. Steel Corp., 470 F. 
Supp. 758, 764 (W.D. Pa. 1979).  
Over the ensuing decades, however, the courts of 
appeals have allowed the term “adverse employment 
action”—which appears nowhere in the statute’s 
text—to take on a life of its own, giving it various 
meanings that impermissibly limit Section 2000e-
2(a)(1)’s broad prohibition on discriminatory 
employment practices. See Pet. 10-19 (describing 
conflicting approaches taken in the circuits). Most 
have added to the statutory language and held that 
Title VII’s prohibition on disparate treatment protects 
only employees who have suffered some sort of 
economic harm. See Autumn George, Comment, 
“Adverse Employment Action” How Much Harm Must 
be Shown to Sustain a Claim of Discrimination Under 
Title VII?, 60 Mercer L. Rev. 1075, 1083-96 (2009) 
(surveying circuit-court decisions).  
The Fifth Circuit has gone even further in 
restricting Title VII’s scope. It recognizes as prohibited 
only what it terms “ultimate employment decisions”: 
“hiring, firing, demoting, promoting, granting leave, 
and compensating.” Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 
F.3d 500, 503-04 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing McCoy v. City 
of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2007)). As 
we next show, that court’s strict limit on actionable 
employment practices is inconsistent with Title VII’s 
text and this Court’s precedent. 
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B. Title VII’s text and this Court’s precedent 
demonstrate that the Act prohibits a broad 
range of discriminatory employment 
practices. 
1. To understand the scope of Title VII’s 
prohibition on discrimination, we start, as we must, 
with the statute’s text. Artis v. D.C., 138 S. Ct. 594, 
603 (2018). Nowhere does Title VII use the word 
“ultimate” to describe prohibited employment 
practices. Nor does the statute otherwise narrow the 
broad terms that Congress used to designate the 
conduct that it proscribes and the harms it seeks to 
redress. By construing the statute so narrowly, the 
Fifth Circuit has effectively “rewrit[ten] the statute 
that Congress has enacted.” See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. 
Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 629 (2018). 
a. As noted above, Title VII’s prohibition on 
disparate treatment makes it unlawful to 
“discriminate against” any individual in the “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). By these words, the 
statute limits the prohibited conduct to discrimination 
based on certain expressly enumerated characteristics 
of the individual (for instance, race and sex), but its 
reach is not limited to any particular type of 
discriminatory employer conduct. 
The operative verb is “discriminate.” To 
discriminate is simply “[t]o make or recognize a 
distinction; to distinguish among or between;” or “[t]o 
treat a person or group in an unjust or prejudicial 
6 
manner.” Discriminate, Oxford English Dictionary.2 
The statute thus encompasses “failure[s] to treat all 
persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be 
found between those favored and those not favored.” 
Discrimination, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014).  
Consistent with the breadth of the statutory term 
“discriminate,” the statute’s drafters did not seek to 
limit it to certain “ultimate” employer actions. Quite 
the contrary. Senators Case and Clark, the managers 
of the Senate bill that became Title VII, explained that 
the statute “is clear and simple and has no hidden 
meanings. To discriminate is to make a distinction, to 
make a difference in treatment or [to] favor … .” Title 
VII, U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, 
Legislative History of Titles VII and IX of Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, at 3040 (1968) (CRA Hist.). Congress 
viewed “discrimination in employment” as insidious 
and thus designed the statute to secure “the 
opportunity for employment without discrimination,” 
and to “protect the right of persons to be free from such 
discrimination.” H.R. Rep. No. 88-914, at 26 (1963) 
(emphases added). If Title VII prohibited only 
ultimate employment decisions, it could not fulfill 
these purposes.  
In sum, Title VII prohibits any differential 
treatment by an employer against an employee 
concerning what the statute calls “terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment.” We now turn to that 
phrase.  
                                            
2 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/54058?rskey=MoSQ9H&
result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid 
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b. The statute’s ban on discrimination in “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment” further 
demonstrates that Section 2000e-2(a)(1) captures a 
wide range of discriminatory employment practices, 
not just those that result in “ultimate” employment 
harms.  
Start with “terms.” In light of the “specific 
context” in which the word is used, Merit Mgmt. Grp., 
LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 883, 893 (2018), 
“terms” means “[p]rovisions that define an 
[employment] agreement’s scope [or its] conditions or 
stipulations.” Term, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 
2014). In other words, “terms” are employment 
“[c]ondition[s] under which something may be done, 
settled, agreed, or granted.” Terms, Oxford English 
Dictionary.3  
Next, “conditions” means “[t]he circumstances or 
factors affecting the way in which people live or work, 
especially with regard to their well-being,” Condition, 
Oxford Living Dictionary,4 or “[t]he whole affecting 
circumstances under which a being exists,” Condition, 
Oxford English Dictionary.5  
And “privileges” means “right[s], advantage[s], or 
immunit[ies] granted to or enjoyed by an 
individual, … beyond the usual rights or advantages 
of others; … exemption[s] from a normal duty, 
                                            
3 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/199409?rskey=thMbUI&
result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid 
4 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/condition 
5 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/38550?rskey=0dQTWu&
result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid  
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liability, etc.; [or] enjoyment of some benefit … above 
the average or that deemed usual or necessary for a 
particular group.” Privilege, Oxford English 
Dictionary.6  
Taken together, then, “terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment” include, at a minimum, any 
characteristic of the employer-employee relationship 
attributable to an employer’s conduct. Put another 
way, the statutory phrase “terms, conditions, or 
privileges” serves as a catchall for all of the daily 
incidents of an employment relationship. After all, 
“[w]hat more could be asked for in the way of 
[statutory] guidelines, short of a complete itemization 
of every [employment] practice which could 
conceivably be a violation?” See CRA Hist. at 3096 
(statement of Sen. Muskie). The Fifth Circuit’s 
ultimate-employment-decision standard cannot be 
squared with the statute’s expansive, unrestricted 
language. 
2. This Court’s precedent also shows that the 
scope of the statutory prohibition—Title VII’s ban on 
discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges 
of employment—is not limited to ultimate 
employment decisions.  
a. This Court’s early Title VII decisions 
understood that the section of the statute at issue 
here, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), “generally prohibits 
racial discrimination in any employment decision.”  
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 796 
(1973) (emphasis added). The statute’s primary 
                                            
6 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/151624?rskey=WnLHFw
&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid 
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purpose, this Court said, was to ensure “equality of 
employment opportunities and to eliminate those 
discriminatory practices and devices which 
have … disadvantage[d] minority citizens.” Id. at 800 
(emphasis added). Thus, “in enacting Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit 
all practices in whatever form which create inequality 
in employment opportunity due to discrimination on 
the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.” 
Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 
(1976) (emphasis added). The statute was not limited 
to narrow categories of discrimination, this Court 
observed, but rather was designed “to strike at the 
entire spectrum of disparate treatment” in 
employment. Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (emphasis 
added) (citation omitted). That is, “[t]he emphasis of 
both the language and the legislative history of the 
statute is on eliminating discrimination in 
employment.” Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 
432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (emphasis added); see also 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796 (“[I]t is 
abundantly clear that Title VII tolerates no racial 
discrimination.”).  
b. This Court’s later sex-discrimination decisions 
are to the same effect. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 
U.S. 69 (1984), explained that “terms, conditions, 
[and] privileges” of employment include any benefit 
that is “part and parcel of the employment 
relationship,” is an “incident[] of employment,” or 
“form[s] an aspect of the relationship between the 
employer and employees,” and may “not be doled out 
in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer 
would be free … simply not to provide the benefit at 
10 
all.” Id. at 74-75 (citations omitted); see also Oncale v. 
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 
(1998) (confirming that the phrase “terms, conditions, 
or privileges” is not limited in “the narrow contractual 
sense”); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57, 64 (1986) (“the language of Title VII is not limited 
to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination”). These 
broad constructions of Title VII demonstrate that the 
Act’s disparate-treatment prohibition cannot be 
limited to ultimate employment decisions.  
c. This Court also has recognized that severe or 
pervasive sexual harassment, without more, affects 
the terms and conditions of employment. See Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor, 477 
U.S. at 73. So too with an employer’s failure to provide 
religious accommodations. See E.E.O.C. v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 
2033-34 (2015). An employer’s refusal to allow a 
Muslim woman to wear a headscarf, for example, is, 
without more, discrimination under Title VII even 
when it is unaccompanied by an ultimate employment 
action such as a refusal to hire or a firing. See id. The 
reasoning of these decisions also shows that Title VII 
proscribes far more than ultimate employment 
decisions. 
II. The Fifth Circuit’s impermissibly narrow 
ultimate-employment-decision standard 
authorizes discrimination that other circuits 
rightly find actionable. 
As the petition demonstrates, the circuits are 
intractably fractured on what kind of employer actions 
constitute impermissible discrimination under Title 
VII. Pet. 10-17. Some require an ultimate employment 
decision, see id. at 10-11, some do not, see id. at 12-14, 
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and some ping-pong between the two rules, see id. at 
16-17. Whatever the exact configuration of the 
(undeniable) circuit split—which includes varying 
formulations even among the circuits which reject the 
Fifth Circuit’s approach, see id. at 12-16—one thing is 
clear: Many courts of appeals condemn as 
discriminatory under Title VII conduct that the Fifth 
Circuit views as permissible. 
The stories that follow are collected from 
published decisions outside the Fifth Circuit. In each, 
the court accepted the facts presented as true and then 
determined, correctly in amici’s view, that the plaintiff 
had suffered a form of discrimination prohibited by 
Title VII even though she did not experience what the 
Fifth Circuit views as an ultimate employment 
decision.  
A. Office settings and working conditions 
The Fifth Circuit’s standard allows employers to 
discriminate among their employees regarding 
working conditions—even when they put employees at 
risk of serious harm or render them unable to do their 
jobs effectively. By contrast, in other circuits, this type 
of discrimination is prohibited by Title VII. 
• Firefighters Anne Wedow and Kathleen Kline 
were issued “bunker gear,” safety equipment that had 
to “fit properly to ensure that the body is protected 
from injury due to smoke, water, heat, gasoline, and 
chemicals and to ensure the mobility needed while 
fighting a fire.” Wedow v. City of Kansas City, 442 
F.3d 661, 666-67 (8th Cir. 2006). But the Fire 
Department issued them ill-fitting gear designed for 
men. Id. The fire stations had “restrooms [that] were 
located in the male locker rooms with the male shower 
12 
room, doors were not secure, males had the keys, and 
where female restrooms existed, they were unsanitary 
and often used as storage rooms.” Id. at 667-68. The 
Eighth Circuit upheld a jury verdict because “[t]he 
record amply demonstrates that the terms and 
conditions of a female firefighter’s employment are 
affected by a lack of adequate protective clothing and 
private, sanitary shower and restroom facilities, 
because these conditions jeopardize her ability to 
perform the core functions of her job in a safe and 
efficient manner.” Id. at 671-72.  
• Efrain Reynaga and his son were the only 
millwrights of Mexican descent at Roseburg Forest 
Products. Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 
F.3d 678, 683 (9th Cir. 2017). The two shared a locker 
for their personal belongings, which they secured with 
a lock. Id. at 684. One day, the police brought in dogs 
to search for drugs. Id. Though Efrain offered to open 
his locker, the mill owner broke the lock. Nothing was 
found inside. Id. at 684. But when the dogs barked at 
a white co-worker’s locker, the owner never opened it. 
Id. at 693. The Ninth Circuit recognized this disparate 
treatment as unlawful. Id. at 695. 
* * * 
The Fifth Circuit’s ultimate-employment-decision 
standard would not recognize Ms. Wedow’s, Ms. 
Kline’s, and Mr. Reynaga’s claims as actionable under 
Title VII because their employers did not terminate, 
refuse to compensate, or demote them. See McCoy v. 
City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559-60 (5th Cir. 
2007). 
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B. Transfers and changes in duties or shifts 
The Fifth Circuit recognizes transfers or shift 
changes as ultimate employment decisions only when 
they would have the “effect of a demotion or denial of 
promotion” and the employee is placed in an 
“objectively worse” position. Alvarado v. Texas 
Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 613-614 (5th Cir. 2007). But 
other circuits have recognized that discriminatory 
transfers and shift changes can significantly affect an 
employee’s terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment even when they are not ultimate 
employment decisions. 
• Dr. Carmen Rodriguez, a female junior-high art 
teacher, was transferred to teach elementary school 
students because the school district “wouldn’t have a 
male grade school art teacher,” id. at 364, causing her 
“severe professional … trauma.” Rodriguez v. Bd. of 
Educ. of Eastchester Union Free Sch. Dist., 620 F.2d 
362, 366 (2d Cir. 1980). The school district explained 
at the time that her transfer “does not and will not 
diminish her salary; does not and will not reduce her 
benefits, her seniority rights, or add any increased 
load to her work performance.” Id. at 365. But the 
“radical change” in the nature of her work still 
“constitute[d] interference with a condition or 
privilege of employment adversely affecting her 
status” and was thus impermissible under Title VII. 
Id. at 366.  
• Robert Supinger, a white man, and his Korean 
wife were the only couple against which the Virginia 
Department of Motor Vehicles enforced its anti-
nepotism policy. Supinger v. Virginia, 167 F. Supp. 3d 
795, 804 (W.D. Va. 2016). When Mr. Supinger was 
transferred as result of the policy, his daily commute 
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time increased six-fold to three hours. Id. at 807. “The 
inconvenience and expense caused by such a lengthy 
increase in commute time [was] sufficient to cause a 
significant detrimental effect on the terms and 
conditions of Supinger’s employment.” Id. at 807-08. 
* * * 
Because transfers and shift changes are 
actionable in the Fifth Circuit only when they are 
objectively equivalent to a demotion, Dr. Rodriguez’s 
and Mr. Supinger’s injuries would go unremedied if 
litigated there. See Alvarado, 492 F.3d at 613-614. 
C. Actions with consequences for future 
employment 
• Noel Abboud was “the only employee of Arab 
ancestry” at the Jamesville Correctional Facility. 
Abboud v. Cty. of Onondaga, 341 F. Supp. 3d 164, 168 
(N.D.N.Y. 2018). Mr. Abboud maintained that, as a 
result of anti-Muslim bias, he was denied firearms 
training, which did not limit his ability to earn 
overtime, but made him ineligible for certain overtime 
shifts. Id. at 173. He was also disciplined more harshly 
than other employees for similar minor breaches of 
protocol. Id. at 174. These discriminatory decisions 
constituted unlawful employment actions under Title 
VII. Id. at 179. 
• Officers Bernadette Baltzer, Tricia Markham, 
and Julie Rortvedt—Sun City’s only full-time female 
police officers—saw special assignments given 
exclusively to male officers. Baltzer v. City of Sun 
Prairie Police Dep’t, 725 F. Supp. 1008, 1011-14 (W.D. 
Wis. 1989). Though the court granted summary 
judgment to the City on these claims because the 
officers did not properly allege that they would have 
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taken the special assignments given the chance, the 
court never questioned that Sun City’s treatment of 
the officers would be employment discrimination (and 
thus actionable) if properly supported in the record. Id. 
at 1026-28. 
• Dr. Deepa Soni’s employer interfered with her 
future job prospects. Soni v. Wespiser, 239 F. Supp. 3d 
373, 378-81 (D. Mass. 2017). After suing her former 
employer for race and gender discrimination, Dr. Soni, 
an Indian neurosurgeon, twice sought employment at 
other hospitals. Id. Although both initially expressed 
interest in hiring her, neither did. Id. Her former 
employer gave unsolicited, unfavorable references to 
the other hospitals, suggesting that she would file 
meritless discrimination charges. Id. Dr. Soni 
maintained that her former employer’s discrimination 
tarnished her reputation and deprived her of the two 
jobs. See id. at 380-81. The court held that job 
references are a privilege of employment that may not 
be given on a discriminatory basis. Id. at 383. 
* * * 
Employees’ career prospects almost always 
depend on establishing a good track record in their 
current positions. But within the Fifth Circuit, 
employers may discriminate in job responsibilities, 
Thompson v. City of Waco, 764 F.3d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 
2014), performance awards, and disciplinary write-
ups, see Puleo v. Texana MHMR Ctr., 187 F. Supp. 3d 
769, 781-82 (S.D. Tex. 2016). See also Lopez v. 
Kempthorne, 684 F. Supp. 2d 827, 885 (S.D. Tex. 2010) 
(same as to performance awards). In the Fifth Circuit, 
the Sun City police officers, Mr. Abboud, and Dr. Soni 
could not have pursued their Title VII disparate-
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treatment claims because their employers did not 
discriminate against them in an ultimate employment 
decision. For Dr. Soni in particular, her former 
employer’s discriminatory job references would fall 
short of the Fifth Circuit’s inflexible ultimate-
employment-decision standard because the employer 
who discriminated was not the employer who refused 
to hire her. 
D. Employment prerequisites 
Shortly after Dr. Sagun Tuli, a female spinal 
neurosurgeon, joined the hospital staff, a male 
colleague, Dr. Day, began belittling female doctors. 
Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 
2d 32, 38-39 (D. Mass. 2008), aff’d, 656 F.3d 33 (1st 
Cir. 2011). He questioned Dr. Tuli’s skills and 
judgment. Id. This mistreatment continued until Dr. 
Tuli needed to be re-credentialed to continue working 
at the hospital. Id. at 36, 43. Dr. Day was selected to 
present Dr. Tuli’s case to the Credentials Committee. 
Id. at 44. He said that Dr. Tuli should not be re-
credentialed because her “mood swings” made her 
intolerable to work with. Id. at 45. Based on Dr. Day’s 
presentation, the committee voted to re-credential Dr. 
Tuli but only if she received a psychiatric evaluation. 
Id. Requiring Dr. Tuli to receive an evaluation as a 
condition of being re-credentialed was sufficiently 
adverse to support her disparate-treatment claim. Id. 
at 36-38, 59.  
Dr. Tuli was denied a prerequisite to her 
continued employment granted to other employees 
without incident. In the Fifth Circuit, her employer 
would have been able to delay, condition, or deny this 
prerequisite on a discriminatory basis because those 
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actions do not constitute ultimate employment 
decisions. See McCoy, 492 F.3d at 559-60. 
E. Leaving the workplace 
After returning to work from her honeymoon 
visibly pregnant, Alana Shultz’s boss told her she 
would be fired. Shultz v. Congregation Shearith Israel 
of City of New York, 867 F.3d 298, 302 (2d Cir. 2017). 
She was offered a six-week severance package in 
exchange for “a complete waiver of her right to 
commence an action for pregnancy or gender 
discrimination.” Id. Ms. Shultz refused. Id. Three 
weeks later, her employer reversed course, and she 
kept her job. Id. at 301-02. But she had already 
“experience[d] the dislocation of losing her 
employment at a particularly vulnerable time.” Id. at 
307. The court reasoned that Ms. Shultz’s employer 
took an adverse employment action against her. Id. at 
305. Because Ms. Schultz’s employer didn’t actually 
fire her, whether its actions would be considered an 
ultimate employment decision by the Fifth Circuit is 
uncertain at best.  
F. Disproportionately heavy workload 
• Carlos Vega, a Hispanic high school math 
teacher, was regularly assigned classes with more 
Spanish-speaking students than were other teachers. 
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 
88 (2d Cir. 2015). It was “twice as much work” to 
prepare for class. Id. at 76-77. The court found that 
this discriminatory assignment was “more disruptive 
than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job 
responsibilities,” affecting the terms and conditions of 
his work. Id. at 87. 
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• Stephen Pothen, a maintenance engineer of 
Indian descent, was also expected to do more work 
than his colleagues. Pothen v. Stony Brook Univ., 211 
F. Supp. 3d 486, 489-90 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). “[U]nlike 
other engineers, he was at times not provided with a 
utility assistant, requiring him to do the work of [an] 
engineer … and assistant at the same time.” Id. at 494-
95. The court viewed this disparate treatment as 
actionable because Mr. Pothen was given a 
disproportionately heavy workload compared to his 
similarly situated colleagues. Id. 
• Christie Davis was the only female electrician 
at her workplace. Davis v. Team Elec. Co., 
520 F.3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir. 2008). Unlike her male 
co-workers, she was often forced to work alone and 
assigned the most hazardous work. Her supervisor 
told her to do piping and ceiling work for weeks on end, 
causing extreme neck pain. She was given a 
“disproportionate number of jobs that entailed 
working with Monokote, a hazardous material.” Id. 
Though Ms. Davis’s onerous tasks were in her job 
description, she suffered actionable discrimination 
because “in the aggregate she was given a 
disproportionate amount of dangerous and strenuous 
work.” Id. at 1090.  
* * * 
The outcome below, in petitioner Peterson’s case, 
demonstrates that the Fifth Circuit would hold that 
the disparate treatment endured by Mr. Vega, Mr. 
Pothen, and Ms. Davis is not prohibited by Title VII. 
Mr. Peterson and other black employees maintain 
that, on account of their race, they were required by 
their employer to work outside in the heat, while white 
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employees worked inside in air-conditioned comfort. 
But according to the Fifth Circuit, “[t]aking this as 
true,” they did not suffer discrimination under Title 
VII. Pet. App. 4a.  
III. Title VII’s disparate-treatment prohibition 
outlaws any discriminatory conduct or 
practice attributable to the employer that 
causes the employee meaningful harm.  
As just shown, many courts view as 
discriminatory under Title VII various employer 
practices that would not be ultimate employment 
decisions (and thus not actionable) in the Fifth Circuit. 
But even circuits that have taken a broader view than 
the Fifth have nonetheless restricted the statutory 
prohibition against discrimination in a manner at 
odds with Title VII’s text and purposes.  
As discussed above (at 5), to discriminate means 
simply “to distinguish between or among” people or 
groups. See Discriminate, Oxford English Dictionary.7 
And the phrase “terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment” includes myriad characteristics of the 
employer-employee relationship. See supra at 7-8. 
This Court should thus hold that Title VII means what 
it says: Employers may not discriminate against their 
employees with respect to any “terms, conditions, and 
privileges” of employment on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin, period.  
Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ing] against any 
individual” on the basis of certain characteristics. 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added). So a Title VII 
                                            
7 http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/54058?rskey=MoSQ9H&
result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid 
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plaintiff must show that the employer’s discrimination 
harmed her. But the statute does not demand a 
minimum level of actionable harm. Any 
discriminatory employer conduct that results in 
meaningful harm to an employee—that is, harm that 
a reasonable employee would view as negatively 
affecting any of the circumstances of her 
employment—is all that the statute requires. Cf. Wis. 
Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 
214, 231 (1992) (noting the traditional requirement, 
inferable from any enactment, that de minimis 
applications of a statute generally are excluded from 
coverage).  
This requirement of meaningful harm should not 
be confused with a far greater requirement that the 
employee show immediate economic harm, much less 
the kinds of “ultimate” workplace harms that the Fifth 
Circuit demands. As shown above (at 5-10), Title VII’s 
text and history, and an unbroken line of this Court’s 
precedent, contemplate no such restrictions. And as 
the lower-court precedent reviewed in Part II 
illustrate (at 11-19), many discriminatory employer 
actions that have no immediate pocketbook impact 
nonetheless impose serious harms on employees, 
worsening their present-day workplace circumstances 
and their future employment prospects. 
Rejecting the lower courts’ atextual adverse-
employment-action doctrine would not impose any 
unreasonable obligations or litigation burdens on 
employers, but, rather, would simply apply Title VII 
as it was written and intended. Importantly, liability 
for Title VII disparate-treatment discrimination will 
still be limited to only those situations where the 
plaintiff can prove that the employer intentionally 
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discriminated on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. See Tex. Dep’t Cmty. Affairs v. 
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). That is a significant 
burden. See id. at 257-59; St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. 
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509-12 (1993). And the harm 
suffered by the employee must be attributable to the 
employer based on principles of agency law and this 
Court’s precedent. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998). In sum, the 
floodgates will not open, and the statute’s text and 
purposes will be honored. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be 
granted. 
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